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Psychology, Science, Feminisms, and Cultural Studies:  
A Book Review Article of New Books by Bell and Harding 
 
In Confronting Theory: The Psychology of Cultural Studies (2010), Philip Bell sets out to critique the 
body of work produced by scholars of and practitioners in cultural studies. Although Bell is careful to 
indicate that he is particularly concerned with those uses of Theory that aim to describe psychological 
matters, the goal of the book is clearly spelled out in its preface: "to break out of the circular corral of 
textuality and the question-begging defense of inter-textuality" (9). Thus, although the book starts on 
a somewhat conciliatory note with Bell musing on the irony of his having written this book since, after 
all, he has spent most of his professional career "analyzing essentialism and reductionism" (8), it soon 
becomes obvious that his disdain for cultural studies does not stem from what he perceives as an ex-
cessively textualist interpretation of culture, but, rather, that he is objecting to the textual turn that 
cultural studies took in the 1970s. 
Confronting Theory, however, is not an attempt to turn back the clock and return to the Marxist 
exploration of working class culture of the early days of the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cul-
tural Studies, but an attempt to debunk the "metaphysical houses of cards that 'Theory' writers have 
constructed" (9). The eight essays that constitute the book can be read independently as a series of 
critiques of Theory's scientific value that point out what Bell perceives as methodological and concep-
tual inconsistencies or as a, sometimes redundant, long essay on the validity of understanding subjec-
tivity as a textual construct. While Bell is careful to describe the scope of his criticism arguing that it is 
cultural studies, and more specifically a psychologizing branch of cultural studies, that he aims to cri-
tique, his essays often generalize what he refers to as "Theory-speak" as the only type of work that 
goes on in departments of literature and often making catastrophic assessments of the state of the 
humanities such as: "the edifice of twentieth-century Anglophone humanities appears to be crumbling 
from within" (136). This type of sweeping generalization is particularly surprising since it seems a bit 
far-fetched to argue that all scholarship coming out of departments of literature conforms to the dic-
tates of cultural studies when there is plenty of evidence that the supposed hegemony of the textualist 
approach that Bell abhors in cultural studies has been contested from its inception (Susan Sontag's 
1964 "Against Interpretation" certainly comes to mind). In the last ten years we have witnessed a re-
newed criticism of cultural studies by those who advocate a return to the traditional role of literary 
criticism as the authoritative judge of the aesthetic value of cultural production, a return that Bell 
seems to be sympathetic to. Among the most prominent texts of the return to the aesthetic are James 
Soderholm's Beauty and the Critic: Aesthetics in the Age of Cultural Studies, Michael Clark's The Re-
venge of the Aesthetic, Elaine Scarry's On Beauty and Being Just, Wendy Steiner's Venus in Exile: The 
Rejection of Beauty in Twentieth-Century Thought, and Denis Donoghue's Speaking of Beauty. Bell's 
indictment of cultural studies for compounding "the devaluation of humanities education across the 
board" (135) insinuates that — had departments of literature been doing their job as critics of the aes-
thetic instead of trespassing into disciplines like psychology — the depreciation of cultural capital that 
the humanities have undergone in Western universities could have been averted or slowed down. 
Bell's omission of any reference to criticisms of cultural studies from within literary studies helps him 
present a bleak picture of Theory as a whole and that does not seem to aim at promoting the revalua-
tion of the humanities but to designate an expiatory goat. The general tone of Bell's collection of es-
says, as their collective title promises, is certainly confrontational. He does not mince words when ex-
posing what he perceives as Theory's flawed logic. In one of the chapters, he compares the notion of 
affect articulated by Gilles Deleuze and further developed by Lisa Blackman, among others, to the na-
ïve ontology of a five year old (90). Despite his call to cultural studies scholars to engage in a con-
structive dialogue with the social sciences (specially with psychology) so that their working concepts 
and methodology can be clarified and rendered much more effective, Bell's criticism of cultural studies 
promotes a further entrenchment of the positions of those in favor and against the discursive analysis 
of culture. 
In Chapter 1 Bell traces the origins of cultural studies in what he describes as an understandable 
response to the alliance of repressive policy and the social sciences that characterized the 1950s and 
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1960s. Reacting to this alliance of political and academic power, Bell argues, was certainly necessary, 
but the terms in which this reaction was articulated were, according to him, flawed from the very be-
ginning. Cultural studies scholars did not engage in a constructive criticism of the disciplines that they 
criticized but, rather, chose to dismiss them altogether (17). Bell is particularly disturbed by what he 
interprets as cultural studies' refusal to accept the possibility of any type of epistemological certainty. 
Most of his essays are predicated on a narrow interpretation of the 1970's textualist turn: the idea 
that calling attention to the discursive nature of science and questioning its truth value are one and 
the same thing. Bell mentions as an example of what he perceives as antiscientific nonsense Andrew 
Milner and Jeff Browitt's defense of Luce Irigaray's statement that Einstein's formula E=mc2 is 
masculinist because it privileges what goes fastest. His response to those who, like Milner and Browitt, 
argue that the discursive analysis of a scientific text does not necessarily dispute its scientific value is 
to turn the tables on them and argue that the problem is not the discursive nature of science but Cul-
tural Studies resistance to evaluate its own statements in terms of their truth or falsity (i.e., the faulty 
scientific methodology of cultural studies) (26). Bell is certainly not the first to express concern for 
what some perceive as the antiscientific slant of Anglophone humanities departments. As early as 
1994, Paul R. Gross and N. Levitt published Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrel 
with Science, a book in which they already warned against "the open hostility toward the actual con-
tent of scientific knowledge" they detected in academic circles (3). Interestingly, Bell makes no refer-
ence to Gross and Levitt in his own book. This omission may be due to the fact that while Gross and 
Levitt present their argument in political terms (i.e., the academic left is antiscientific), Bell rarely re-
fers to the political orientation of those scholars whom he considers antiscientific and restates the case 
by accusing not the left, but cultural studies scholars with the lack of scientific methodology. 
In Chapter 2, Bell tries to unveil one of the oxymorons on which cultural studies is supposedly 
built: the Deleuzian invitation to develop an ontology of becomings. "An 'ontology,'" he informs us, "is 
a theory of what exists, what can be narrated as really existing, perhaps" (31). Referring to Greg 
Hainge's claim that cultural studies "has no ontology of its own" (32), Bell aims to provide a critique of 
how ontologies come into being. Certainly, if an ontology amounts to "what can be narrated as really 
existing" (32) any ontology should by definition be open to a textualist analysis, not because the con-
sistency of the physical world is questionable, but because our ability to comprehend and represent 
(i.e., narrate) the world is certainly limited. Given the initial premise of Bell's argument, it is not sur-
prising that the book reads as a reductio ad absurdum of some of the most widely acclaimed work 
produced in cultural studies in the last decades. Bell, true to the scope of his book stated in his pref-
ace, is particularly troubled by those areas within cultural studies that more directly challenge basic 
notions of human psychology. Donna Harraway's and Kathleen Hayle's critique of humanism (73-85) 
and Deleuze's and Blackman's exploration of the notion of affect (89-104) occupy most of the second 
part of his book. As it could be anticipated, Bell's critique of post-humanism follows the same circular 
logic of his critique of Deleuze's ontology of becomings: how can Theorists "speak as though 'persons' 
are excess conceptual baggage" (75)? Bell makes no distinction between, for example,  Harraway's 
ironic critique of humanism in "A Cyborg Manifesto" or Raymond Kurzweil's futuristic musings on the 
possibility of human identity being contained in software (77). Bell's bibliographic notes present 
Kurtzweil (spelled with a "t") as the author of "I can process binary opposites therefore I am," an arti-
cle on artificial intelligence published in the Australian glossy Black + White that was actually written 
by Alex Craig. This may just be a typo or it may be Bell's attempt to emulate Sokal, but presenting the 
work of Kurzweil as an example of cultural studies is a misrepresentation. A more nuanced analysis of 
the different uses that have been made of Harraway's provocative essay would have certainly been 
appreciated. It is also true, however, that Harraway has often blurred the lines between academic 
writing and science fiction, her 1997 book Modestwitness is probably the best example of this. 
The notion of affect as conceptualized by Deleuze and developed in the work of Blackman is the 
type of textualist approach that most directly challenges concepts traditionally accepted by psycholo-
gy. Bell's critique of the notion of affect is, as I point out above, particularly negative. He accuses both 
Deleuze and Blackman of reification and of assuming that the existence of affect as they describe it 
derives directly from the fact that they can name it. This is why he compares their work to the naïve 
ontology of a five year old's. "In Cultural Studies," Bell argues, "as in religion, the verbal creation of a 
world of pulsating micro-forces allows writers to continually poeticize mundane matters of experience 
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such as perception, and to write about what sound like new kinds of aesthetics and science" (90). For 
a staunch advocate of realism and an equally staunch critic of textualist interpretations of reality like 
Bell, Deleuze's, Blackman's and, we could add here, Teresa Brennan's abstract explorations of the no-
tion of affect can be nothing less than reification (or bluffing, as he refers to Theory in the last chapter 
of his book) (135-36). Surprisingly, Bell chastises cultural studies scholars for ignoring Sigmund 
Freud's and William James's equally metaphysical uses of the term affect in favor of Deleuze's. In his 
account, the Deleuzian notion of affect seems to be entirely gratuitous and no mention is made of 
Deleuze's attempt to critique and think beyond the Freudian narrative of Western subjectivity. In Con-
fronting Theory, Freudian conceptualizations of affect within an economic model of drives that pro-
motes individual over group identity are taken as fact. Bell refuses to acknowledge the cultural ele-
ments that inform Freud's and James' narrative of the workings of the human psyche, and, as a result, 
the significance of the critique of Western subjectivity in the work of Deleuze, Blackman, and Brennan 
seems to be lost to him. Once again, a more nuanced critique of the concept of affect would have 
been useful here, particularly because Deleuze's notion of affect has its own problems. In critiquing 
Western subjectivity and attempting to develop a deterritorialized economic model of drives, Deleuze 
seems to be making the same mistake he criticizes in Freud: creating a supposedly culture-neutral 
model of subjectivity. 
Bell's critique of cultural ctudies concludes with the proposal that "realism be reinstated as the 
'default position' in the humanities at least until arguments to the contrary are built into the relevant 
curricula" (129). He is asking for traditional philosophical and psychological accounts of subjectivity to 
be taught side by side the critique of its premises provided by cultural studies. Despite the negative 
tone of the book, this final proposal seems reasonable. Bell complains that students are exposed to 
critiques of traditional epistemology without familiarizing themselves first with the body of work that is 
being criticized (129). I would not assume that all students are taught in humanities courses is Theo-
ry, but it is true that the wide range of work critiqued by cultural studies presents a pedagogic chal-
lenge not only in undergraduate but also in graduate courses: "Theory and its epistemological dilem-
mas," Bell argues, "can be taught dialogically, by argument and counterargument" (140). Yet, Bell's 
seemingly modest proposal to teach Theory side-by-side with traditional forms of epistemology does 
not seem to match his characterization of cultural studies as antiscientific nonsense. In the context of 
Bell's dismissive portrayal of cultural studies, a dialogical approach to building a humanities curriculum 
that combines realist epistemology and cultural studies critiques does not come across as an attempt 
to develop knowledge by building on the insights of both of them, but as yet another version of the 
destructive cultural wars in which each side aims to cancel each other out. And, with regard to the 
criticism of the anti-scientific nature of cultural studies, Bell appears to be unaware of scholarship in 
"comparative cultural studies," a framework whose construction and application are based on fields in 
the social sciences including (radical) constructivism and the empirical study of literature and whose 
practitioners are found not only in literary study but also in psychology and education.  
 The idea that the critique of science that characterizes some of cultural studies scholarship 
amounts to little more than the uninformed bluffing of some scholars in the humanities, as Bell would 
put it, and this view does not take into account the truly interdisciplinary origins of this body of work. 
As early as 1970, the publication of Thomas S. Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions triggered 
an analysis of scientific discourse from within the scientific community. During the following decades, 
the body of work produced by scientist that followed Kuhn's line of work increased exponentially and 
this was particularly true among biologists who found the combination of feminism and cultural studies 
especially useful in their field. Works including Ruth Bleier's Science and Gender: A Critique of Biology 
and Its Theories on Women (1984), Anne Fausto-Sterling's Myths of Gender (1985), Lynda Birke's 
Women, Feminism, and Biology (1986), and Ruth Hubbard's The Politics of Women's Biology (1990) 
among others established that the discursive analysis of science is a concern for those who take both 
scientific knowledge and its effect on society seriously. 
The objective of this critique of scientific discourse, despite Bell's reiterated accusations to the 
contrary, has not been to systematically discard Western epistemology, but, rather, to consider ways 
in which to develop a self-reflective scientific practice. The preoccupation with the social repercussions 
of scientific research predates the arrival of cultural studies, as well as the critique of the scientific dis-
course pioneered by Kuhn. In The Social Function of Science (1939) J.D. Bernal's advocated for the 
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need to develop an ethics of scientific research. Bernal's proposal was problematic in that it tied this 
scientific ethics to a narrowly defined political (socialist) agenda, but the effort to integrate ethical and 
scientific discourse remained a constant concern for those that have studied scientific discourse since 
then.  
I would like to provide a wider context in which to evaluate the ways in which textualist critiques 
are not only not antiscientific but can benefit scientific research by considering the proposal for an al-
ternative conceptualization of science presented in Sandra G. Harding's Sciences from Below: Femi-
nisms, Postcolonialities, and Modernities (2008). The main project of Harding's book speaks to Bell's 
main criticism of cultural studies (its dismissal of traditional epistemology and refusal to articulate a 
constructive criticism of the sciences). Harding's goal is "to 'calibrate' to each other progressive 
tendencies in Northern science and technology studies, Southern science and technology studies, fem-
inist work, and modernity studies. I propose that each needs the success of the others for its own pro-
jects" (8). Harding advocates for a reassessment of Western and non-Western knowledge instead of 
"romantic evaluations of one and demonizations of the other" (6). Coming from Harding, whose career 
has been built on the critique of Northern science, as she refers to it, this attempt at reconciling the 
two sides of the dispute over Western scientific discourse is particularly interesting. Her proposal does 
not represent an attempt to soften the critique on Western sciences, nor an idealistic call for a return 
to the pre-modern, but an invitation to use the insights of science and technology studies to improve 
science and vice versa. 
The first part of the book reviews the work of Bruno Latour, Ulrich Beck, and the collective work of 
Helga Nowotny, Peter Scott, and Michael Gibbons. Harding finds their work appealing for a series of 
reasons: all of them find postmodernism relevant in as much as it describes the symptomatology of 
modernity's ills, but politically limited; they agree in considering that science has become a kind of 
governance in which knowledge production is deeply intertwined with power; they believe that the 
transformation of science cannot happen without the transformation of the political context in which 
science takes place (25). All of them argue against abandoning modernity and propose slightly differ-
ent ways of continuing/renewing the project of modernity. Harding's contribution to their shared posi-
tions is to bring feminism into the picture since women's perspectives were, for the most part, absent 
from their arguments. From Latour, Harding takes his critique of the conceptualization of science as a 
culture-neutral discourse: the traditional representation of scientific discourse as mere description of 
fact. But Latour is not advocating for a return to social constructivist views of nature. Social construc-
tivism can only result in "a relativist conceptual framework of incommensurate worlds wherein differ-
ent cultures simply have different beliefs about nature and social relations" (Latour qtd. in Harding 
31). Social constructivism, according to Latour, is based on a mononaturalism: the belief that there is 
one fixed nature that pre-exists its conceptualization by different cultural traditions. In this conceptual 
framework, it would be impossible to compose a "common world." Latour reminds us that not only 
each culture shapes an idiosyncratic conceptualization of nature, but that nature is constantly shaping 
culture(s). Science should, consequently, have the ability to compose a common world in as much as 
both Western and Eastern, Northern, and Southern sciences are open to assume the challenges that 
nature is constantly posing to their cultural beliefs. Harding's proposal is deeply informed by Latour's 
insight as we shall see. 
Beck's critique of the self-validating advance of science in Risk Society is also crucial to Harding's 
proposal. Beck argues that "science is one of the causes, the medium of definition, and the source of 
solutions to risks, and by virtue of that very fact it opens up new markets of scientization for itself" 
(Beck qtd. in Harding 54). Beck is concerned by the dehumanization of science in which the benefit of 
the individual, the community, or the environment is constantly deferred. Beck tells us, however, that 
we have entered a second modernity in which the firm grip on science by scientist seems to be slip-
ping away. We all contribute to scientific knowledge in as much as we are constantly being asked to 
make decisions when faced with contradictory scientific findings. According to this, science is becom-
ing increasingly self-reflective. Beck's overtly optimistic assessment of science is certainly problematic 
in that it overemphasizes the transition from a first to a second modernity as Harding tells us, but the 
idea that ordinary people may take charge of scientific agendas is certainly appealing to her (56). 
Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons argue that the central role that science played in the project of moderni-
ty has gradually dissipated. This has produced, Harding explains, "an alarming decline in science's 
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ability (and authority) to define the reality of the natural world; on the other hand an unprecedented 
increase in its power to manipulate and intervene in that world" (87). Modernity and science no longer 
seem to share the same agenda, an insight that echoes Latour's comments in We Have Never Been 
Modern as well as Beck's critique of science for science's sake. 
In the second part of the book, Harding reviews a selection of the existing literature on the mar-
ginalization of folk and Southern scientific knowledge from Northern scientific discourse. The expan-
sion of Northern sciences promised to liberate Northerners and Southerners alike; however, the reality 
is and has been different. Harding is particularly eloquent in her critique of how globalization has not 
resulted in an improvement of quality of life for Southern peoples: "the policy and practice of devel-
opment has largely further impoverished the already economically and politically disadvantaged of the 
Third World, of which women and their dependents make up the vast majority" (169). Standpoint the-
ory provides the necessary counterbalance by conceptualizing how knowledge is relative to the van-
tage point from which it is articulated. The aerial, culture-neutral epistemology that science promises 
is actually grounded in a specific point of view: a male and Eurocentric one. Standpoint theory and the 
feminist science accounts that it has inspired have been helpful in advocating for "expanded [scien-
tific] principles and practices" (126). Harding reminds us that any initiative to develop an alternative 
epistemology from the generic point of view of "women," or "third world women" is, however, prob-
lematic in that it can easily replicate the imperialist gesture that characterizes Northern science impos-
ing a generic agenda on women (157-58). Conceptualizing and articulating Third World Women's 
standpoints is both a political necessity and an epistemological challenge, there is not just one stand-
point just as we cannot speak of just one modernity. 
In part three of her book, Harding addresses the concern that a Eurocentric version of modernity 
may manage to impose itself wiping out tradition. She reminds us that tradition is not a monolithic 
entity but one that is constantly created by modernity. Modernity constantly appropriates elements of 
tradition and presents them as modern (170-83). Hence, the exchange between tradition and moder-
nity has always been going on, Harding's proposal is to bring this exchange to the foreground so that 
we can appreciate not only how modernity shapes tradition but also how tradition can mold modernity 
into new shapes. We hear here echoes of Latour's conceptualization of nature as an active agent in 
shaping culture. This is Harding's most ambitious argumentative turn, she is simultaneously making a 
case for the patriarchal nature of modernity and locating women as principal elements of tradition. 
Harding presents the constant redrawing of the lines that separate modernity from tradition as a male 
compulsion to abject the female body of tradition: "my major point in this chapter has been that the 
widespread prevalence of gender stereotypes within modernized societies is not a mere residue of tra-
ditional social relations, as modernization theorists and their Marxian critics have consistently pro-
claimed. Rather, these stereotypes are built into the founding conceptual framework of modernization 
thinking; it is stereotypes of the masculine, defined in terms of their distance from 'the feminine,' that 
indicate what counts as modernity and what counts as social progress" (212). Harding does not, to her 
credit, lapse into an abstract, psychoanalytic explanation of a possible talking cure for modernity's fear 
of femininity. Instead, she proposes that science follow the "feminist standpoint mantra to 'start re-
search and politics from women's lives" (225). Science should redraw its research agendas considering 
the diverse standpoints of women's lives. This proposal is intended, as Harding tells us, as a provoca-
tion, a reminder that science has walked away from its self-proclaimed commitment to modernity. 
Harding's critique of science and her proposal remind us of Terry Eagleton's critique of cultural 
studies, echoed by Bell, that "the freedom of text or language would come to compensate for the 
unfreedom of the system as a whole" (Eagleton qtd. in Bell 134). Reading Bell's often excessive cri-
tique of cultural studies one has to agree that the interpretive "technologies" of our field may have, 
like Beck argues in the case of science, become, at times, their own justification. Cultural critics, I 
would argue, borrowing from Harding's proposal, need to remind themselves that the purpose of cul-
tural studies was and should continue to be to start research from women's lives. This is not to say 
that textualist interpretations are not valid, but that the critique of knowledge is not a goal in itself, 
but, hopefully, a means to a better world. Western feminism admitted long ago to the limitations of its 
foundational Eurocentric standpoint and the need to include the points of view of non-Western wom-
en. These marginal standpoints, however, are not static, they are constantly changing and hence the 
need to start research, again and again, from women's lives. 
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